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must come from the objective succession of the phenomena, but the rule, which makes the order of the successive perceptions necessary, derives from mind. "It is true," he says, "that the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the succession of events, as a concept of cause, becomes possible only when we have used it in experience, but, as the condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, it was nevertheless the foundation of all experience, and consequently preceded it *a priori*." This seems to show that Kant's *a priori* can not be considered as merely an activity of mind, and that the necessary rules, or laws, which make nature possible, are in fact original laws which precede experience. And indeed how could we ascribe universality and necessity to those laws, if it required some *a posteriori* element to arrive at them? If the concepts and principles of the understanding were not purely *a priori*, we could have no certain knowledge of phenomena, which are only appearances of the true reality; and the opposers of Kant could rightly ask: how can you boast of establishing the necessity and universal validity of the laws of nature, if you do not and can not absolutely know the real causes of phenomena? Such an objection has no meaning against Kant, for in his theory necessity is synonymous with apriority, and the laws of nature are laws of mind.

This does not prove that Kant was quite right, and that his interpreter is quite wrong, but it shows that the former is perfectly consistent and the latter inconsistent, in so far as he has not examined all the consequences of reducing the *a priori* to a mere activity of mind. This reduction represents a logical development of Kant's "Critique" and a natural result of psychological analysis, but—if Kantism is to survive—it requires a new examination and a new theory of the relation between form and matter, sense and understanding, phenomena and noumena, between what is given to mind and what comes from mind. That relation, as Kant has shown, is an insuperable necessity of thought; but Kant made the mistake of establishing a gulf where there is only a distinction, of considering as separate, elements which are intimately connected. Form does not exist apart from matter, nor understanding apart from feeling; and the *noumenon* is not something which exists over and above the phenomenon, but is *in the phenomenon itself*: it is that permanent reality which persists amidst the changing phenomenal appearances, that ultimate and irreducible element, which every metaphysician has finally to admit, and can never be brought under the clear forms of thought. So interpreted, the noumenon is no obstacle to the certain knowledge of phenomena, independently of all *a priori* forms of intuition and concepts of the understanding. And thus can critical philosophy be truly said, as Professor Tocco justly remarks, the only method which reconciles modern science with the moral ideals of humanity.

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*Der Monismus und Seine Ideale.* Dr. JOHANNES UNOLD. Leipzig: Th. Thomas. 1908. Pp. 160.

For the general philosophical reader, to whom "monism" may import many things, the title of the book might have gained in lucidity if quali-

fied by the term "critical," which throughout the work designates the type of monism whose principles the author sets forth. But the clearness with which these principles are expressed, the charm of the style and the forcefulness and candor displayed in the discussion of existing defects in institutional morality, leave little to be desired when one considers the purpose which the book seeks to accomplish. "May this work," says the author in his brief preface, "contribute to the vindication and furtherance of the monistic movement"—better known in its scope and significance to German readers—"which is endeavoring to inaugurate a new age of spiritual and moral progress and ideal advancement, and place a larger number of mature citizens of every stratum of society in a position to think freely, will rightly, and feel nobly without the aid of supernatural incentives."

The last is significant if one reflects that in Germany liberty of belief and conscience, guaranteed as a constitutional right of the individual, there as here, is overridden by custom and public opinion, which are outgrowths of conditions far different from those that obtain in this country, and that the close connection of moral training with denominational religious instruction and dogma provides a situation in more open hostility to moral and social progress. The German Monist League, a "general humanistic movement" which a few years ago "had its initiative in the expansion of the theory of evolution," is endeavoring to combat this situation. For, says the monist, who admits that all genuine monism is also idealism, "idealism is not something which culminates on paper," but rather "a thing to inspire the mind with enthusiasm and devotion." A genuine philosophy, still more a true idealism, must perform its part actively in the work of "perfecting" and "ennobling" humanity.

"Monism and its Ideals" expresses in clear and untechnical fashion for the general reader the laws which, for countless ages, have governed the evolution of organic beings, and which, formulated as the three leading organic laws of life, must also guide humanity in its reasoned progress, a progress that is, nevertheless, but the continuation and enhancement of the evolutional process.

The principles of monism and the scientific data upon which they are based are discussed under three captions, thought, will, and feeling, which mark the three main divisions of the work. Characteristic of the present age is its "mighty longing for truth, for an understanding of the world and life," a desire which can no longer be appeased "by the simple expedients of an earlier time—allusions to faith and revelation—but which turns eagerly to the sources that have distributed knowledge with so lavish a hand in the past hundred years, namely, to science itself." Part I., guided conveniently by Comte's three stages, is a brief statement of successive historical attempts at an understanding of the world and life. Materialism, idealism, mechanicalistic monism, psychical monism (which tends toward pan-psychism) and, finally, critical monism, have a common foe in ecclesiastical dualism. The latter has its origin in tradition and in the naïve thinking of an earlier time, but is supported by a powerful

institution. It is in the ethical sphere that its sharp antitheses and neglect of natural causal relations have the most fatal consequences, deadening conscience to the tasks of the earthly life and thwarting all effort for progress. Materialism and its successor, mechanical monism, correct in their insistence upon scientific method, fail obviously in their endeavor to bring within the scope of mechanical formulæ the complexity of organic life—to say nothing of human psychical life and civilization, while idealism and psychical monism, justly affirming as their starting-point the realities of our experience—psychical processes—far exceed present data in attempting to unfold from physical phenomena a psychical cause. Critical monism, faithful to its belief in the unity of the world of experience, but true also to its scientific insight, does not claim that this unity is empirically demonstrable. Profiting thankfully by the mistakes of mechanical and psychical monism, it sees in the world a dialectic of two methods of thinking, and consciously adopts these methods, one as the corrective of the other. Hence, with psychical monism, it proceeds from above downwards, with constant regard, however, to established results in the physical order, believing that by thus tunneling reality from opposite sides, a single pathway to a unitary conception of the world will ultimately be revealed to man.

Part II. If monism is of value it must have significance for man's practical life. Man is, first of all, an organic being and, though he has acquired a measure of independence from organic instincts and impulses and a certain degree of rational and moral self-determination, it is only by close attention to the laws of organic life that his progress may be assured. Since the creative energies first fashioned life on our planet, life has been threatened with destruction. It has maintained itself only through ceaseless reactions, through the uninterrupted exercise of functions, through struggle and suffering, on the part of organic beings. And now, with the forces of evolution diverted into new channels, man has become in a measure, through his consciousness, the controller of his own destiny. Of this man must become aware and avert the danger of retrogression and decline which has already overtaken races.

From the first law of life, which teaches that the race is preserved in a healthy and vigorous condition only by the skillful adaptation and suitable propagation of individuals, we learn that every man must be a "worker" in the social body, and that the latter must be so ordered that the greatest measure of efficiency may be secured from each individual. The rising generation must be given acquaintance with these facts and with those physical and moral laws which will secure to them a healthy posterity—facts which the other-world view of ecclesiastical ethics has neglected or purposely obscured.

The second law teaches that evolution tends always toward richer variety and greater capability of achievement on the part of individuals and races. Progress is not being accomplished by the reduction of all members of the human race to a dead level of equality, social, political, or moral. Evolution begins in approximate equality but tends toward

diversity, a fact which shows that increasing individuality no less than efficiency for the social welfare, is the goal of evolution in the human species. Materialistic philosophy, eudæmonistic, or hedonistic, ethics, ecclesiastical teaching, all lead from one point of view or another to determinism in morals, egoism, repression, and neglect of the greater part of all that is beautiful, helpful, and hopeful in life. Monism, in conscious recognition of evolutional law, seeks the means by which this increasing diversity of endowment, interest, and purpose may be best turned to account in the progressive "perfecting" and "ennobling" of the individual. The third law, that of the reciprocal dependence of all stages of life upon one another and upon external conditions, carries with it the implication that the more highly endowed peoples and individuals must carry on the work of civilization, occupying the more responsible positions among nations and men. Only when leaders and educators realize their responsibility and answer the call to cooperate in the work of shaping correctly the individual and collective life will the social, like the organic body, thrive and make progress.

Thus monism, free from the clogs and hindrances of myth and supernaturalism, presents duties which are sufficiently high and arduous for any man who really desires self-improvement and the improvement of his kind. And, as the author endeavors to show in Part III., it will bring to humanity rich rewards in the refinement of man's feeling and sensibility. Nature, art, religion, and morality will remain inexhaustible sources of enjoyment and improvement. Nature will be better understood in its union with the psychical; art will be better appreciated; religion will continue to furnish much that will claim devotion and reverence, all the more as it will be seen in its organic connection with human life and history. Self-reliance, sympathy, generosity, and other forms of sentiment and emotion inseparable from nobility of character, will take the place of egoism (ill-concealed under the mask of piety), narrow, capricious and incidental love of neighbor, and misdirected charity which favors only weakness.

As regards its social conception, monism is likewise at variance with "unhistorical radicalism," for evolution means essentially continuity, not the extermination of preceding stages; with anarchism, which is an abnormal form of individualism; with eudæmonism, which is untrue to psychology and evolution; and, finally, with the doctrine of equality which, if allowed, would lead speedily to an equality of ignorance and poverty. Monism, moreover, does not desire to remove competition, but to increase it, securing by gradual adjustments and readjustments within society a fair field for all.

The book contains many fruitful conceptions, to which justice can not be done in the space allotted to a review, and it leaves upon the reader the impress of fairness and seriousness of purpose, which its open arraignment of evils fostered by ecclesiastical dualism does nothing to dispel. In the conclusion the reader is made acquainted with the efforts of the German Monist League to secure a system of education for the people, in

which "revealed" principles of Christian ethics may be supplemented by principles of morality which a scientific monism extracts from the history of organic life and human civilization. The appendix treats briefly the application of monism to politics with special reference to the electoral reform in Prussia, and translates its principles into a scheme for a more equitable representation of classes and parties than that which at present prevails. This portion of the book also is not without suggestion for the American reader.

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*Letters, Lectures and Addresses of Charles Edward Garman: A Memorial Volume prepared with the cooperation of the Class of 1884, Amherst College.* ELIZA MINER GARMAN. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company. Pp. xiii + 616.

To read the Garman volume is to cover one's face in shame. If ever one has thought well of his own teaching, if he has dwelt with complacent memory upon his apt phrases, his effective illustrations, his "sun-clear" expositions, reading the Garman volume, he casts himself down in utter abjectness, praying the high gods pardon for his miserable conceit. This, for the professional philosopher, is perhaps the most salutary effect of the volume. It is the picture of a remarkable man, a thinker of high thoughts, gifted with imagination, with wide grasp, with virile expression, and above all with the rare poet's power of seeing the infinite in the near at hand. In reading the papers one is reminded constantly of the great maker of parables; one finds here, too, that power to take the humdrum meanings by surprise, to draw from them unexpectedly their hidden treasures of truth and beauty. But above all one feels that here, too, the felicity and the power are not for their own sake; rather they are shot through with deep love—love of the work and of the young minds for whom the work was done.

A review of the philosophic contents of the volume must at best be unsatisfactory. What one wishes to know of this hard-working teacher is what he would have said to a larger philosophic public had he been free to use his time for constructive writing. One searches, therefore, through the present volume for the scattered bricks out of which to rear his philosophic structure. But the nature of the writings makes such a task impossible. They are in the main papers printed for class-room use and are therefore written from the point of view of the undergraduate's immature and more general interest. Although they cover well-nigh all the leading problems of philosophy, the pedagogical necessities make it impossible for them to treat the problems in the detailed and searching fashion requisite in constructive philosophy. It would be unfair to build a philosophy out of these papers and eminently unjust to criticize shortcomings that a presentation for a different audience might have avoided.

Yet it is possible to discover certain leading tendencies of thought in Professor Garman's work. Living in the years when the apriorist